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Question 
 What is the current government of Indonesia’s approach to fiscal policy, international 
trade, and inclusive economic growth? 
 What are international (bilateral and multilateral) donors currently working on to support 
trade and prosperity in/with Indonesia?   
 Are there any existing models of international technical cooperation with Indonesia on 
trade / development, which aim to provide mutual benefits to both donor and Indonesia? 
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1. Summary 
This rapid review synthesises the literature from academic, policy, and knowledge institution 
sources on the political economy of Indonesia, concerning recent inclusive growth efforts in 
Indonesia. It can be concluded that the transformation of Indonesia’s economy to a more resilient 
economy, which is integrated within the Asia region, has been successful and gained the country 
more global political powers. However, the economic literature on Indonesia remains limited, and 
“studies that provide a comprehensive and integrated macroeconomic analysis are particularly 
scarce” (Breuer & Kinda, 2018, p.3). Still much of the existing recent literature focuses on the 
periods leading into either the Asian financial crisis or the global financial crisis. The literature 
used in this review, showed that: 
 Indonesia’s economic policy seeks stability before growth. 
 The country has a favourable demographic trend of increasing the working population 
until 2030, and with healthy urbanisation rates, which could increase market 
development.  
 Indonesia reduced poverty levels by half to 11% between 1996 and 2016, but this trend 
has slowed down in recent years. 
 Indonesia faces a challenge with low tax revenue, which has limited the Government’s 
ability to increase public investments in infrastructure, health and social safety nets. 
Indonesia’s investment gap is larger than in other countries in the Asian region. 
 The country faces a low level of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Low participation in 
global and Asian value chains limit Indonesia’s ability to tap further into the growing Asian 
consumer market, complicating the transition from a commodity-dominated economy to a 
more innovative, services-oriented economy. 
The government of President Joko Widodo has recognised that the country is undergoing a 
period of profound economic transition, and has focused on shifting its economy away from its 
dependence on commodities towards one that depends much more heavily on productive 
sectors and services. The Government’s Mid-term Development Plan (RPJMN 2015-2019), 
focuses on human and community development (decentralisation), narrowing the income gap 
through increased productivity and poverty reduction measures (sector approach), and 
increasing development without environmental degradation. It seeks to raise infrastructure 
investment through state-owned enterprises and public-private partnerships. It tries to boost FDI 
and improve the business climate with a one-stop service to expedite investment approvals and 
streamlining the land acquisition process for investments, for example. 
The Government also is preparing for major tax reforms to increase revenues. As this process is 
slow, the Government has tried to collect more taxes through short-term actions and through 
Presidential-level and Ministerial-level regulations. A Tax Amnesty Programme (TAP) launched 
in 2016 raised taxes and fees equivalent to 10.4% of average tax revenues in 2013-15. Through 
regulations issued annually, the government has also revised the tobacco excise, increasing the 
minimum regulated price and raising tariffs. The Government is also trying to improve its 
collection methods, by facilitating the payment of taxes so that the burden on complying 
taxpayers is reduced, mainly through digitalisation. The Government also restructured gasoline 
and electricity subsidies, sparking a critical shift in expenditures away from regressive energy 
subsidies towards higher investment in human and physical capital.  
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Over the past decade, Indonesia has become more protectionist in trade policy, mainly through 
non-tariff measures. More recently, the Government has tried to reform the trade policy, trying to 
make import and export flows more efficient, streamlining non-tariff measures and removing 
some bottlenecks of protectionist policies faced by (international) traders and investors. To 
graduate from the status of basic commodity exporter subject to global price swings, low value 
added, and limited employment growth, Indonesia needs to continue its structural reform efforts 
to improve its competitiveness in higher-technology products, economic complexity, and 
participation in global value chains. 
International donors’ (bilateral and multilateral) development programmes in Indonesia are in line 
and shaped around the Government’s inclusive growth strategy. Key evidence from Australia, 
Denmark, Germany, Japan, Norway, and the US (including UNDP and the World Bank) is 
highlighted below:  
 Environment, climate change, and renewable energy are key areas. All mentioned 
donors have invested substantially in areas of natural resources management, waste 
management, and renewable power infrastructures, in the fight against climate change, 
pollution and loss of biodiversity.  
 In the area of poverty reduction, donors invest in social protection schemes and in 
specific sector programmes, e.g. agriculture, fishery and shipping. Donors work on 
improvements in markets, international value chains (e.g. regulations), and reducing the 
skills and investment gaps, in an attempt to reduce the rising inequality trends and 
improve investment climate during the economic transformation of Indonesia.  
 Although supply chain development and trade facilitation do not seem to be the most 
important development topics for these international donors, they have established trade 
relations with Indonesia with strategic partnership agreements. Hence, development 
spending relate to economic sectors that are important for their businesses: e.g. wind 
energy (Denmark), fishery (Japan and Norway), hydro-power plants (US), electrification 
(Germany), maritime sector (Japan and Germany), and agriculture (Australia). This 
creates mutual benefits, through investments and technical assistance. 
 Donor countries benefit from these development programmes through gaining access to 
better quality, more sustainably supplied inputs, like palm oil, timber, fish and meat. And 
indirectly through climate change measures. 
 However, the development programmes and bilateral trade relations do not seem to have 
a large impact on the further development of the manufacturing sector that can add 
value; investments are concentrated in more “traditional” sectors, like those mentioned 
above. 
2. The political economy of Indonesia’s development 
General trends 
Indonesia has a population of 264 million people, making it the fourth most populous country in 
the world.1 It is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and the world’s sixteenth largest 
economy, with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of approximately US$1 trillion (Breuer & Kinda, 
                                                   
1 Information retrieved from UNCTAD website: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/countryprofile/generalprofile/en-GB/360/index.html  
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2018, p.3). It ranks seventh largest in global purchasing-power-parity terms.2 Indonesia has 
played an increasingly prominent role in the global policy debate, including as a member of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Group of 20 (G20). In the aftermath of 
the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, the country adopted a wide range of political and 
economic reforms (reformasi). A decentralisation programme gave greater direct authority, 
political power, and financial resources to regencies and municipalities (Nasution, 2016). 
Reforms included the adoption of a floating exchange rate, fiscal rules that limited the deficit and 
capped public debt, and an inflation targeting regime. Sectoral reforms opened up the economy 
and have improved the business environment. The FDI regime was partially liberalised, including 
for logistics, tourism, and agriculture. Banking sector reforms overhauled regulation and 
supervision. Hence, as Breuer and Kinda (2018, p.5) conclude: “the economy became much 
more resilient, benefiting from comfortable external positions, low public debt, and ample 
international reserves”.  
Economic growth has stabilised at approximately 5% since 2013 (5.1% in 2018), inflation is 
about 3%, the current account deficit is modest at less than 2% of GDP, and the fiscal deficit has 
been kept below the statutory deficit ceiling of 3% GDP. Although growth is solid, it is well below 
government ambitions to reach 7-8% GDP growth. Economic analysts’ view is that it is 
inadequate in terms of the job creation and economic modernisation required to meet Indonesia’s 
development needs and ambitions: “The problems are structural. Indonesia is hemmed in by the 
need to protect stability while its growth model has struggled to deliver the productivity gains 
necessary to grow faster within this constraint.”3 Some analysts call this Indonesia’s “stability first 
mantra” above economic growth.4  
In development terms, Indonesia reduced its poverty levels by half to 11% between 1996 and 
2016 (Breuer & Kinda, 2018). However, the lower economic growth since the commodity boom 
has been accompanied by much slower progress in reducing poverty and informal employment, 
reflecting Indonesia’s need for faster growth in order to productively absorb its expanding 
working-age population.5 Although there has been some progress, gender disparities remain 
prevalent. The gender gap in labour force participation declined slightly between 1996 and 2016, 
but is still substantial, with the female labour force participation rate at 51% compared with 82% 
for men (Breuer & Kinda, 2018, p.6).  
The literature mentioned some major trends that are likely to transform the Indonesian economy 
in the future:  
 Favourable demographics: Indonesia is undergoing a demographic transition: infant 
mortality has halved to 22 infants’ deaths for every 1,000 live births between 1996 and 
2016, and fertility rate has reduced from 2.5 in 2000 to 2.4 children per woman in 2016 
                                                   
2 Information retrieved from IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2018 database: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/index.aspx  
3 Cited from Roland Rajah online publication for Lowy Institute (August 2018): 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-economy-between-growth-and-stability  
4 As cited by Roland Rajah in his online publication for Lowy Institute (August 2018): 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-economy-between-growth-and-stability 
5 Information retrieved from Roland Rajah online publication for Lowy Institute (August 2018): 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-economy-between-growth-and-stability 
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with the expectation of a 2.1 children in 2030 (Breuer & Kinda, 2018, p.6). The result is 
an increase in the working-age population (defined as persons 15 to 64 years old) of 2.5 
million people a year between 2000 and 2016. The “demographic dividend” will last until 
2030, after which the working population will decline (World Bank, 2015). This 
increasingly educated and IT-savvy youth can boost overall productivity with the right 
policies in place and is expected to increase the growth of Indonesia’s annual GDP per 
capita by close to 0.2 percentage points between 2020 and 2050 (Breuer & Kinda, 2018, 
p.7). McKinsey and Company (2016) estimated that Indonesia’s consumer class could 
grow by 90 million by 2030. Such an increase would represent the third-largest 
expansion of consumers in the world (after China and India), providing unique economic 
opportunities. 
 Rapid urbanisation: By 2025, 68% of the population in Indonesia is projected to live in 
urban areas, compared to 52% in 2012 (World Bank, 2015). As income raises the 
demand for consumer durables, working space and housing will not only increase in 
metropolitan areas, but also increase significantly in smaller cities: “Connecting these 
cities and their inhabitants to rural areas, metropolitan areas and the global economy will 
be essential to attracting firms and achieving shared prosperity” (World Bank, 2015, 
p.14). There is evidence that urbanisation supports growth and poverty in Indonesia, 
relating to the presence of adequate infrastructure and services. This is why Indonesia 
has not gained as much economically for its degree of urbanisation as China and 
Vietnam, nor has poverty declined as much as in these countries, given the degree of 
urbanisation (World Bank, 2018c). 
 Emergence of the digital economy: Due to demographic trends, Indonesia has the 
third-largest youth population in the world and 130 million active social media users 
(Breuer & Kinda, 2018). Therefore, Indonesia is poised to have the largest digital 
economy of all Southeast Asian countries. According to McKinsey and Company (2016), 
digitalisation could expand Indonesia’s economy by 10% by 2025. Most of the digital 
dynamism in the economy relates to ‘big data and advanced analytics’ and ‘e-money’. E-
money, which is mostly used by lower-income individuals, almost quadrupled between 
2014 and 2017 (McKinsey and Company, 2016). A recent survey by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2017) ranked Jakarta as the eighth best city in the world for digital 
companies, and particularly praised it for developing new technologies and for innovation 
and entrepreneurship. 
 Increasing role of Asia, particularly China, in the global economy: With the highest 
expansion of consumers in the world expected in Asia, external demand for Indonesia’s 
products - ranging from agricultural goods to energy, commodities, tourism, and 
manufactured goods - is well positioned within the region, in particular the ASEAN group 
(Breuer & Kinda, 2018). Although China’s current rebalancing of its economy will affect 
commodity exporters such as Indonesia (IMF, 2016; Mathai et al., 2016), China’s 
consumption is expected to increase, which can benefit Indonesia’s agriculture, tourism, 
and manufacturing sectors in particular (World Bank, 2015). 
 Commodity prices: The end of the commodity boom should also increase the relative 
profitability and attractiveness of manufacturing, and can help Indonesia develop its 
industrial base. Lower commodity prices are shifting the political economy in favour of 
reforms that would improve natural resource management. For example, lower prices are 
an opportunity to make more sustainable the growth trajectory of the palm oil industry 
(World Bank, 2015). 
These economic opportunities also face some major challenges, as inequalities have increased 
significantly in Indonesia. Youth unemployment is high, as economic growth does not sufficiently 
absorb all new entries to the labour market, to make the most of the demographic dividend. This 
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has resulted into a large informal labour market (Breuer & Kinda, 2018).6 As the section on fiscal 
policy (below) shows, Indonesia faces a challenge with low tax revenue, which has limited the 
Government’s ability to increase public investments in infrastructure, health, and social safety 
nets. This also hampers investments in digital infrastructure and education, which are also 
important to reap the benefits of the digital economy.  
 
Moreover, as the section on international trade policies shows (below), low level of FDI and low 
participation in global and Asian value chains limit Indonesia’s ability to tap the growing Asian 
consumer market. This complicates the transition from a commodity-dominated economy to a 
more innovative, services-oriented economy (Breuer & Kinda, 2018). Furthermore, the impact of 
the changing global climate bringing higher temperatures, changes in precipitation, flooding and 
rising sea levels are expected to build in Indonesia over the next 20 years, with especially 
negative consequences for the poorest people. These impacts will be felt in food and water 
security and on all those who are dependent on climate-sensitive livelihoods such as fisheries 
and agriculture (World Bank, 2015).  
Government inclusive growth plan 
The Government of President Joko Widodo (inaugurated in October 2014), has recognised that 
the country is undergoing a period of profound economic transition. It had to deal with lower GDP 
growth compared with its key Asian trade partners, particularly China. The reason is that 
commodity prices of key exports have fallen by 40% since their 2011 peak, and domestic private 
consumption which has been the main driver of growth, has softened. The Widodo administration 
therefore has focused on shifting its economy away from its dependence on commodities 
towards one that depends much more heavily on productive sectors and services (World Bank, 
2018a; IMF, 2018). The Government’s Mid-term Development Plan (RPJMN 2015-2019), reflects 
its strategy to meet these development challenges by focusing on human and community 
development (decentralisation), narrowing the income gap through increased productivity and 
poverty reduction measures (sector approach), and increasing development without 
environmental degradation.7 
One of the pillars of the development plan is green economy, focussing on green cities. This 
includes eradicating illegal logging, fishing and mining, as well as improving governance in 
natural resources, and increasing community participation in forest management.8 In addition, 
the development plan identified key sectors for future economic development. Priority sectors are 
food, energy, maritime affairs, manufacturing and tourism. Indonesia, for example has the 
ambition is to become a “maritime nation” and regional and global player in maritime affairs 
(JICA, 2018). To get the necessary funding for investment, in 2015, the Joko Widodo 
administration reduced fuel subsidies, which had been the cause of financial rigidity, and thereby 
created fiscal space for increasing the budget for infrastructure development. In order to 
overcome the constraints on development budget, efforts have been made to actively utilise 
                                                   
6 Information also retrieved from Roland Rajah online publication for Lowy Institute (August 2018): 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-economy-between-growth-and-stability 
7 Link to the non-English development plan 2015-2019: https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/Medium-
Term%20National%20Development%20Plan%20%28RPJMN%29%202015%E2%80%932019.pdf  
8 Information retrieved from the London School of Economics website: http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/law/national-
medium-term-development-plan-2015-2019-rpjmn-2015-2019/   
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private funds for infrastructure, by promoting deregulation on foreign capital and developing the 
mechanism for public private partnership (PPP) (JICA, 2018).  
On the other hand, the Government has focussed on reducing income disparity among regions 
with significant budget allocations to local governments. Furthermore, it has emphasised 
investments in education and health, medical care, and welfare policies for the poor. In particular, 
goals are set to achieve national public insurance, as well as improve the subscription rate of 
labour insurance by 2019 (JICA, 2018). Bearing in mind that the demographic bonus ends in the 
2030s, the Indonesian Government has been trying to enhance the social security system. 
To boost growth, the authorities have accelerated infrastructure development and improved the 
business environment. Public investment on infrastructure has increased with several projects 
currently under construction. The Government has selected 247 priority infrastructure projects, 
with a total cost of US$323 billion (32% of GDP), to be implemented in 2015−22 (IMF, 2018). 
The plan centres on improving logistics, power generation, water and sanitation, and oil 
refineries. These include constructing 3,650 km of roads, 3,258 km of railways, 24 new seaports, 
and 15 new airports. The plan also includes developing power plants with total capacity of 35 
GW, 33 new dams, and new oil refineries of 600,000 barrels per day (IMF, 2018).  
The authorities can do this because they seek to raise infrastructure investment through state 
enterprises and public-private partnerships (PPPs). Also, coordination has been strengthened. 
The authorities established the Committee for Acceleration of Priority Infrastructure Delivery 
(KPPIP) to coordinate priority projects, including by commissioning or amending feasibility 
studies. The Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM)’s one-stop service has also helped expedite 
investment approvals, and the land acquisition process has been streamlined and made more 
flexible (IMF, 2018). 
The authorities have also implemented 16 economic policy packages since 2015 to streamline 
regulations and strengthen productivity. The FDI regime was partially liberalised, barriers to entry 
have been reduced, including on logistics, and the setting of the minimum wage has been made 
clearer (IMF, 2018). A single submission system, covering the licenses of both central and 534 
regional governments, is being introduced to improve coordination with line ministries and local 
governments (IMF, 2018). Reflecting these efforts, Indonesia’s World Bank’s Doing Business 
ranking improved markedly to the 72nd position in 2018 from the 106th position in 2016 (World 
Bank, 2018b). 
Fiscal policy 
Since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the Indonesian government has taken several steps to 
improve its fiscal structure. Fiscal caution is reflected in State Law No. 17 in 2003, which limits 
Indonesia’s budget deficit to 3% of GDP and Government debt to less than 60% of GDP. The 
Government’s success in maintaining the budget deficit at less than 3% of GDP since 2000 
ensured that the Government-debt-to-GDP ratio is now low at 30% of GDP, down from 90% in 
2000 (Basri, 2018).  
Indonesia still has a weak tax revenue performance (Jin, 2018; World Bank, 2018b). General 
government revenue has trailed behind other countries in the region, with the gap widening after 
2008, mainly related to the sharp decline in oil and gas revenue. Non–oil and gas revenue as a 
share of GDP remains weak, close to its 2004 level, and has been declining in recent years (Jin, 
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2018). However, the low tax ratio is also the product of tax policy design decisions. As tax rates 
are similar with peer countries in the region,9 sub-optimal policies include (Word Bank, 2018b): 10  
 Extensive VAT exemptions;  
 High VAT registration threshold level;  
 Distortive preferential regimes;  
 High non-taxable income threshold for personal income tax, and 
 Underutilisation of externality-correcting taxation such as tobacco taxation and green 
taxes.  
These policies were designed with different intentions. Ultimately, however, they have resulted in 
a collective narrowing of the tax base; a reduction in the tax burden on some sectors, types of 
taxpayers and types of economic activity; greater inefficiencies, and greater space for tax 
avoidance and evasion (World Bank, 2018b). In addition to revenue losses, tax incentives and 
exemptions encourage substantial arbitrage behaviour in the Indonesian economy, leading to 
inefficient resource allocation. The same value-added tax (VAT) threshold and numerous VAT 
exemptions also lead to breaks in the VAT chain, significantly compromising the VAT’s efficiency 
and neutrality. In addition, all these exemptions and thresholds have significantly complicated tax 
administration (Jin, 2018).  
The result is that the Government is constrained by its revenue-mobilisation capacity, as 
spending on infrastructure, health, and education is generally behind that of peers. For example, 
Indonesia’s infrastructure spending is low compared with that of its peers (IMF, 2017). Total 
infrastructure spending was 2.2% of GDP in 2016, compared with the emerging market Asia 
average of 5.1% of GDP (World Bank, 2018b). Indonesia’s access to infrastructure is particularly 
low in electricity, road transportation, and health facilities. Starting in 2017, 25% of central 
Government transfers to regions via the general allocation fund (Dana Alokasi Umum, or DAU) 
and revenue sharing were ear-marked for infrastructure. However, the non-central-government 
channels seem to involve more risk and entail less capacity to develop, plan, and implement 
                                                   
9 Jin (2018) states that at 10%, the standard value-added tax (VAT) rate is modest, but in line with other countries in the region. 
The statutory Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rate is 25%, in line with the OECD average and with that in major emerging market 
economies. The Personal Income Tax (PIT) schedule, comprising four marginal tax rates (5%, 15%, 25%, 30%), is also 
generally consistent with other emerging economies (Jin, 2018). However, Indonesia’s C-efficiency ratio is about 0.6, which 
means the authorities only collect 60% of total VAT revenue. In addition, CIT productivity (defined as the ratio between CIT 
revenue as a percentage of GDP and the top CIT rate) is low (Jin, 2018). Factors that could explain such low tax productivity, 
include the numerous lower-rate regimes for corporations, generous exemptions, and weakness in tax administration. Jin 
(2018, p.88) states that “[t]hese findings suggest that there is much room to improve tax policy”. 
10 Examples of lower-rate CIT regimes mentioned by Jin (2018) are: a 1% presumptive tax on gross revenue for small and 
medium enterprises with annual turnover of less than IDR 4.8 billion (about USD355,100), a rate reduction of 50% for taxable 
income corresponding to gross turnover up to IDR 4.8 billion for medium-sized enterprises with annual turnover of less than Rp 
50 billion, and a reduced rate of 20% for publicly listed companies. Many VAT exemptions have been granted to both final and 
intermediate goods and services by the VAT law and government regulation, including for mining (unprocessed products); 
staple foods (agriculture); tourism (hotel and restaurant), transportation, and employment services; banking and insurance; art 
and entertainment services; education, medical, and social services; capital goods (machinery, plant, and equipment); 
agricultural, plantation, and forestry products; electricity (excluding that supplied to households whose consumption exceeds 
6,600 watts); distributed piped water; cattle, poultry, and seeds; weapons for the army; educational books; ships, trains, and 
aircraft and their spare parts, and low-cost housing. Some of the exemptions (e.g. for staple foods) are commonly used in other 
countries to protect the poor, but most other exemptions in Indonesia are not common. The turnover threshold for mandatory 
VAT registration is IDR 4.8 billion, the same as the previously mentioned CIT threshold for the 1% turnover tax in lieu of the 
regular CIT. This threshold is very high compared with other ASEAN countries. This VAT threshold covers only 50,000 firms.   
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investment projects efficiently (IMF, 2018). Hence, based on IMF (2018) research, an indicator 
for physical access to infrastructure shows relatively low efficiency in Indonesia’s public 
investment. The resultant efficiency gap between Indonesia and the most efficient countries with 
comparable levels of public capital stock per capita is 56%, much wider than the average gap for 
emerging market economies (41%), emerging and developing Asia (50%), and all countries 
(41%). 
The impact of Indonesia’s overall fiscal policy on inequality reduction has been very limited, 
compared with other emerging market countries, particularly those in Latin America (Jin, 2018). 
Where Latin American countries spent much of their windfall revenue from the commodity boom 
in the 2000s on equity-enhancing areas such as social assistance, health, education, and 
infrastructure, Indonesia has mandatory spending floors for health and education (5% and 20% 
of budgetary expenditure, respectively). However, as Jin (2018) mentiones, Indonesia still has 
much room for spending on its most equity-enhancing programmes, particularly on conditional 
cash transfers (Programme Keluarga Harapan, or PKH), targeted rice transfers (Beras untuk 
Rakyat Miskin, or RASKIN), and scholarship programmes for poor students (Bantuan Siswa 
Miskin, or BSM). 
Tax reform is a challenging process, as legislation is complex and requires balancing multiple 
political and business interests. So that it can be passed through cabinet and parliament, the 
Ministry of Finance is preparing major tax law changes, as well as preparing a medium-to-long 
term tax reform strategy to guide the reform process for the next few years. As the process is 
slow, the Government has tried to collect more taxes through short-term actions and through 
Presidential-level and Ministerial-level regulations (World Bank, 2018b). A Tax Amnesty 
Programme (TAP) launched in 2016 raised taxes and fees equivalent to 10.4% of average tax 
revenues in 2013-15, and led to declarations of total assets worth IDR 4,882 trillion, 39.3% of 
2016 GDP (World Bank, 2018a). TAP success was driven in part by the ability of the 
Government to persuade high net worth individuals to participate. Efforts to collect more at the 
upper end of the tax bracket also took the shape of proactive involvement in the OECD-led 
Inclusive Framework to tackle base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), which Indonesia adopted 
in July 2016. In June 2017, Indonesia became one of the signatories of the Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (MLI); by September 2018, Indonesia is set to undertake the first information exchange 
as part of the automatic exchange of financial account information (AEOI) (World Bank, 2018b).  
Through regulations issued annually, the Government has also revised the tobacco excise, 
increasing the minimum regulated price and raising tariffs. The Government is also trying to 
improve its collection methods, by facilitating the payment of taxes so that the burden on 
complying taxpayers is reduced. In July 2015, for instance, the Government launched an 
electronic VAT invoice online application that enables systematic submission of detailed 
information on taxable goods and services by taxpayers, as part of a policy of mandating VAT for 
businesses that came into effect in 2016-17 (World Bank, 2018b). Electronic e-filing systems are 
also being developed and rolled out, with the Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) seeking to 
gradually enforce e-filing of corporate income taxes and of withholding taxes from employees’ 
payrolls.  
The Government has recently spent more in areas that relate to inclusive growth. In 2015, the 
Government removed gasoline subsidies, sparking a critical shift in expenditures away from 
regressive energy subsidies towards higher investment in human and physical capital (IMF, 
2018; Breuer & Kinda, 2018; World Bank 2018b). In 2017, the Government also improved the 
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targeting of electricity subsidies by moving the non-poor and non-vulnerable (900 VA) household 
customers under a non-subsidised tariff (World Bank, 2018b). The amount allocated under the 
Specific Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus, DAK), designed to boost local infrastructure, has 
increased at a compound annual growth rate of 30% in nominal terms from 2008 to 2016 (World 
Bank, 2018b).  
International trade policy 
Since the start of the new millennium, compared with the rapid expansion of domestic demand, 
Indonesia has become relatively less integrated with the global economy in both trade and 
finance, even though it has maintained its global market (Isnawangsih & Lu, 2018). Indonesia 
has doubled its merchandise trade with the rest of the world and maintained its overall share in 
the global market broadly unchanged at 1%. However, its exports as a percentage of GDP 
halved between 2000 and 2016. Exports and imports represented, respectively, 40% and 32% of 
GDP in 2002, and declined steadily to less than 20% by 2016 (Isnawangsig & Lu, 2018).  
The decline in Indonesia’s external sector exposure is in particular the result of falling trade with 
advanced economies. Between 2000 and 2016, the share of Indonesia’s exports to advanced 
economies declined by about 25 percentage points, and the share of imports from advanced 
economies declined by an even larger 45 percentage points (Isnawangsig & Lu, 2018). The 
region that absorbed those declining shares from advanced economies was predominantly 
emerging Asia, to which Indonesia’s export shares rose by about 20 percentage points and from 
which its import shares rose by about 30 percentage points, respectively (Isnawangsig & Lu, 
2018). 
Observers of Indonesia over the years note that this reflects a complex set of factors, including 
“legacies from the crisis along with a large domestic base and favourable demographics and 
urbanisation, which enabled strong growth without high reliance on exports” (Isnawangsig & Lu, 
2018, p.163). More recently, the Government has adopted a protection policy, which also played 
a role in the decline. However, analysts show that achieving Indonesia’s ambitious growth 
objectives - and generating quality jobs for its expanding labour force - will require higher 
productivity and technological innovations that may be best facilitated by greater integration 
(World Bank, 2018b; Isnawangsig & Lu, 2018).11  
A closer look at the composition of exports from the perspective of competitiveness also shows 
that Indonesia has yet to improve its competitiveness in products with higher-technology 
components, and has low export sophistication and limited economic complexity; whereas some 
neighbouring countries have significantly improved competitiveness (e.g. Vietnam, Thailand, the 
Philippines) (Breuer & Kinda, 2018; Isnawangsig & Lu, 2018; World Bank, 2018a).12 To graduate 
                                                   
11 Information also retrieved from Roland Rajah online publication for the Lowy Institute (August 2018): 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-economy-between-growth-and-stability 
12 Isnawangsig and Lu (2018) show that five key traditional commodity products (gas, oil, coal, palm oil, rubber) have 
contributed much to the dynamics of Indonesia’s exports. Their dynamics synchronised with global commodity price cycles. For 
example, their total share in exports jumped from 30% in 2000 to a peak of 50% in 2011 before gradually declining to 34% in 
2016. Coal and palm oil have replaced oil and gas as the top two export products. The maturing of oil and gas fields, lack of 
infrastructure investment, and higher domestic demand have turned Indonesia into a net importer of oil and gas since 2011. 
The global share of palm oil exports almost doubled from 28.1% to 54.5% and that of coal almost tripled from 6.7% to 19.5%. 
However, the shares of key non-commodity exports, such as electrical appliances and textiles, in total exports declined 
between 2000 and 2016. Increased regional competition from Bangladesh, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam intensified as 
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from the status of basic commodity exporter subject to global price swings, low value added, and 
limited employment growth, Indonesia needs to continue its structural reforms efforts to improve 
its competitiveness in higher-technology products, economic complexity, and participation in 
global value chains (World Bank, 2018a). 
Although Indonesia’s declining openness may reflect weakness in the business environment, 
which has hampered investment and weakened competitiveness, particularly in the export sector 
(IMF, 2016), protectionist policies have also played an important role (World Bank, 2018a). The 
trade regime had become increasingly open after the Asian Financial Crisis, with complete 
deregulation of agricultural products and the removal of most non-trade barriers. However, since 
then, protectionist measures have risen, particularly on food crops, and these protections have 
increasingly taken the form of non-tariff barriers such as licensing requirements:  
 Tariffs: In the past years, Indonesia has hiked import tariff rates, which increases the 
cost of production inputs and consumption goods, in contrast to the region’s tendency 
towards tariff reduction. Between 2000 and 2017, Indonesia has increased its average 
import tariff rate by 1.3 percentage points and its tariff rate on intermediates by 0.3 
percentage points (World Bank, 2018a). While the country started from relatively low 
import tariff rates, Indonesia’s trend over time contrasts with that of most other countries 
in Southeast Asia, which have substantially reduced their tariff rates. The use of import 
tariffs has also included the imposition of antidumping measures on a number of 
products—including steel and yarn—to protect domestic producers from alleged unfair 
import competition.  
 Non-tariff measures: Indonesia has also increased the application of non-tariff 
measures on goods imports, which are often justified by health, safety, and 
environmental concerns, but which can also significantly increase importing costs. These 
measures consist of import licenses and checks aiming to ensure that imported goods 
are safe for consumers and do not harm public health or the environment. These include 
diseases carried by plant and animal imports, or safety hazards from goods handled by 
children. While some of these are legitimate concerns, other measures appear to 
unnecessarily increase the costs of importing (World Bank, 2018a).  
 Import barriers on services: Barriers to legal service imports include prohibiting foreign 
lawyers to set up a commercial presence or practice law in Indonesia; in distribution 
services - foreign investments are not allowed in a large part of retail distribution, 
including supermarkets and minimarkets; in maritime transport - foreign companies 
cannot transport goods between Indonesian ports, hence severely restricting competition 
in a key transport sector. Recent evidence shows that higher barriers in services stifle 
competitiveness in Indonesian manufacturing industries that use these services more 
intensively in production (World Bank, 2018a).  
 Barriers on financial flows: The difference between Indonesia and its regional peers is 
especially noticeable - external assets and liabilities in the Philippines and Thailand are 
well in excess of 100% of GDP, while in Indonesia it counts for 80% (Isnawangsig & Lu, 
2018). Some measures of regulatory restrictiveness indicate that Indonesia has one of 
the most restrictive FDI regimes within the ASEAN-9, including bans on foreign 
                                                   
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) phased out quotas on textiles and clothing in 1995–2005, while competition from China 
rose after its accession to the WTO in 2001 (Pangestu et al., 2015). 
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participation in certain sectors. A host of policy barriers - many included in the Negative 
Investment List - raise the costs of investing in Indonesia, particularly for foreign investors 
(Isnawangsig & Lu, 2018). Key examples of such restrictions are included in Indonesia’s 
negative investment list (Daftar Negatif Investasi, or DNI), in the form of foreign equity 
limits, sectoral reservations to micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), special 
licenses, and minimum local content requirements (World Bank, 2018a). These 
restrictions significantly reduce both foreign and domestic investments, reduce entry and 
performance, and increase prices in the sectors to which they are applied. Following the 
introduction of a DNI restriction (foreign equity limit, SME reservation, or special license), 
the entry of new foreign manufacturing plants declines, particularly those which are 
export-oriented, and so does the exit of domestic plants that are less exposed to 
competition (World Bank, 2018a).  
The Indonesian Government has implemented a number of significant trade reforms in 2018. A 
national single window system to automate export and import permits has been introduced in 
more than 21 ports. The authorities are also planning to streamline non-tariff measures, gradually 
shifting control from border to post border, with an attempt to facilitate the processing of imports 
and exports (IMF, 2018; World Bank, 2018b). For example, the Government is aiming to move 
the inspection of documents required for the import of a number of products from the border to 
post-border audits. This measure has been so far applied to over 2,000 products included in the 
list of prohibited and restricted goods, so-called “Lartas”, mainly through a series of new Ministry 
of Trade regulations. This list comprises 5,229 products, which are subject to the most stringent 
importation requirements (World Bank, 2018b). The reform should facilitate the importation 
process, as it would speed up the customs clearance process, which would become automatic. 
Given the burdensome documentary requirements associated with the import of many “Lartas” 
products, the potential gains in terms of costs and time savings are particularly large (World 
Bank, 2018b).  
In a closely related reform, the Government has also sought to simplify and rationalise the 
documentary requirements for imports on several “Lartas” goods in two ways. First, the Ministry 
of Trade has abolished some of the import licenses for certain products, such as cement and 
related products, and has reduced the number of supporting documents required to obtain the 
import approval, such as the “Deed of Establishment” on corn imports, the technical 
recommendation by line Ministries for importing products such as tires, corn, iron, steel and 
related products (World Bank, 2018b). Second, the Government has reduced the existing 
duplications among various ministries and agencies that require the same supporting documents 
for issuing permits and licenses to import the same good (World Bank, 2018b).  
These new trade policies seem measures to counter protectionist measures, however, at the 
same time, the Ministry of Trade also issued a new protectionist regulation. From April 2018 it 
has forced exporters of crude palm oil (CPO) and coal, as well as importers of rice and 
Government procured goods, to use Indonesian-flagged vessels and to insure their traded 
products with Indonesian companies. The ostensive objective is to promote the domestic 
shipping and insurance industries and reducing the large trade deficit, particularly in transport 
services (World Bank, 2018b).  
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3. Bilateral and multilateral inclusive development and 
trade support 
Australia 
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) estimation is that it will spend 
US$224 million of official aid in Indonesia in 2018-19. Australia’s aid to Indonesia has been 
structured around its Aid Investment Plan 2015/16-2018/19, which aligns with the priorities of 
Indonesia’s National Medium-Term Development Plan 2015-2019. This development plan has a 
strong focus on eastern Indonesia “to help address regional disparities in development, while 
maintaining growth momentum in other parts of the country.” Australia’s Aid Investment Plan has 
three objectives: 
1. Effective economic institutions and infrastructure: Australia’s efforts to boost inclusive 
growth and productive jobs through access to better quality of infrastructure includes support for 
financial sector stability, revenue mobilisation, and improved Government spending and tax 
collection. Furthermore, it centres support around sanitation, road infrastructure projects and 
agricultural markets for poor farmers in eastern Indonesia. 
Examples of initiatives granted funding from DFAT, are: 
 Indonesia Australia Infrastructure Partnership (US$104 million for 2016-2021). This 
partnership also known as KIAT (Kemitraan Indonesia Australia Untuk Infrastruktur) aims 
to tackle Indonesia’s infrastructure gap by supporting a reduction in regulatory constraints 
that impede infrastructure investment, and a greater a greater capacity of Government 
bodies responsible for infrastructure delivery. The Water and Sanitation Grant 
Programme and the Provincial Road Improvement and Maintenance Programme are 
implemented under this partnership.13 
 Multilateral Development Bank Infrastructure Assistance Programme (US$40 million 
for 2013-2019). Through this programme Australia works with the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, and the Indonesian Government to support activities, including 
infrastructure project preparation support and implementation, feasibility studies, 
engineering designs, and environmental impact assessments. The programme also has 
supported the establishment of the Public Private Partnerships Centre in the Indonesian 
Ministry of Finance.14  
 Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Economic Development (US$103 million for 
2018-2023). This partnership, also known as PROSPERA, aims to foster more effective 
Indonesian economic institutions and policies that contribute to inclusive economic 
growth. The partnership contains the idea of mutual benefits for a sustainable and 
inclusive economic growth of Indonesia, as Indonesia is the largest export market for 
                                                   
13 See also the investment design document: https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/indonesia-australia-
infrastructure-partnership-facility-design-document.pdf  
14 See also the evaluation report of the programme: https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/multilateral-
development-bank-infrastructure-assistance-program-independent-evaluation.pdf  
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Australia in Southeast Asia. Key development areas within PROSPERA are financial 
institutions, market development, transport sector and the public sector.15  
 Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Promoting Rural Incomes through Support for 
Markets in Agriculture (US$68 million for 2019-2023). This programme, also known as 
PRISMA-2, is the continuation of the Aid Investment Plan-Rural. The aim is to increase 
the incomes of an additional 700,000 smallholder farming households by a minimum of 
30% using a market system development approach. It will strengthen the focus on policy 
influence by equipping decision-makers with evidence and the development of strategic 
partnerships with key policy and agri-business influencers.16  
 Indonesia-Australia Partnership on Food Security in the Red Meat and Cattle 
Sector (US$35 million for 2013-2024, with additional US$7 million in non-ODA funding 
from the Department of Agriculture). This partnership aims to strengthen long-term 
economic relations between Indonesia and Australia to improve the cattle and beef 
sector supply chain. This is in order to support Indonesia’s food security and to promote 
closer ties in the beef and cattle sector, with the aim to secure the Australian export 
market to Indonesia. Through the partnership, Australia has exchanged skills in beef 
processing, cattle production and husbandry and agriculture policy. In 2016, it 
established the Indonesia-Australia Commercial Cattle Breeding Programme.17  
2. Human development for a productive society: Programmes within this cluster aim to 
develop human capital to create the conditions for higher and inclusive growth. It tries to identify 
local challenges and opportunities, and develops approaches to tackle problems and make the 
most of opportunities (i.e. to health and nutrition, such as for Indonesia's human and animal 
disease prevention) and response capacities to increase national, Australian and global 
biosecurity. Australia Awards Scholarships (US$118 million for 2014-2022) are an important part 
of Australia's education assistance to Indonesia, which also includes technical assistance for 
education system strengthening (US$8.5 million for 2015-2020), Australia-UNICEF Rural and 
Remote Education Initiative for Papuan Provinces (US$12 million for 2014-2018), and the 
contributions to the World Bank Trust Fund for Improving Dimensions of Teaching, Education 
Management, and Learning Environment (US$6.5 million for 2016-2019).18 
3. An inclusive society through effective governance: Australia works with Indonesia to 
develop better quality economic and social protection policies and for developing a 
comprehensive social protection framework (from MAHKOTA Indonesia: US$45 million for 2016-
2019). In this cluster of programmes, Australia also aims to support women’s (Australia-
Indonesia Partnership for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: US$77 million for 2012-
2020) and marginalised groups’ (Programme Peduli: US$25 million for 2014-2019) economic and 
political empowerment. It also includes improving access to legal services and support for court 
                                                   
15 See for more information the investment design document https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/australia-
indonesia-economic-cooperation-partnership.pdf or on the PROSPERA website: https://prospera.or.id/.   
16 See for more information the investment design document: https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/business-
opportunities/Documents/aip-prisma-2-idd-17-nov-2017.pdf  
17 See for more information the investment design document for the cattle breeding programme https://dfat.gov.au/about-
us/publications/Documents/indonesia-cattle-breeding-program-investment-design.pdf or the websites: 
http://www.redmeatcattlepartnership.org/ and http://www.iaccbp.org/.  
18 See for more information: https://dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/development-assistance/Pages/human-development-in-
indonesia.aspx  
15 
reforms (Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice Phase 2: US$28 million for 2017-2022) and 
local community empowerment support for community-based development programmes and 
participatory local governance (Local Solutions to Poverty Programme: US$135 million for 2008-
2020).19 
Australia and Indonesia signed the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA) on 4 March 2019.20 This Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is the 
final step within the Trade and Investment Framework that seeks to enhance cooperation on 
trade, investment and business climate issues; forge a closer policy dialogue on mutual trade 
and investment issues; contribute to trade and investment facilitation through minimising 
impediments, promoting transparency in regulations, and reducing costs, and promote business 
competitiveness and closer linkages in sectors (including textiles, clothing and footwear, health, 
education and legal services, food and agricultural processing, energy and mining, and 
infrastructure development).21  
Denmark 
In 2017, Official Development Aid from Denmark to Indonesia was US$12.3 million.22 More than 
three quarters of the aid budget was for the Environmental Support Programme (Phase 3), which 
ended in 2018. This programme supported three main themes: environmental management, 
energy sector initiatives, and improved Natural Resources Management. It is based on three 
components:23  
 Improved local impact from implementation of policies and environmental management, 
also in the field of climate change mitigation and adaptation.  
 Improved implementation of energy efficiency, energy conservation, and renewable 
energy policies.  
 Climate change mitigation through natural resources management, including Community-
based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM).  
Denmark development cooperation with Indonesia focusses mainly on environmental and 
renewable energy projects (e.g. waste management, clean energy, and energy efficiency).24 
Many private sector and sector related initiatives are related to the same themes, with the aim to 
invest in renewable energy sector and waste management and create business-to-business 
partnerships. For example, Denmark and Indonesia launched a government-to-government 
energy cooperation initiative, with a focus on private sector involvement to the projects where 
                                                   
19 See for more information: https://dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/development-assistance/Pages/inclusive-society-in-
indonesia.aspx  
20 Information retrieved from: https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/iacepa/Pages/indonesia-australia-
comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement.aspx  
21 Information retrieved from: https://dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/Pages/trade-and-investment-framework.aspx  
22 Information retrieved from the Danida OpenAid database: http://openaid.um.dk/en/countries/ID?Y=2017  
23 Information retrieved from the Environmental Support Programme (Phase 3) in Indonesia webpage on the Danida OpenAid 
database; http://openaid.um.dk/en/Projects/DK-1-204597  
24 Information retrieved from the Danida OpenAid database: http://openaid.um.dk/en/countries/ID?Y=2017 
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possible.25 Although the main purpose was to build up capacity and understanding, as well as 
introducing new perspectives on the use of renewable as a reliable and affordable energy 
source, the cooperation also resulted in the signing of a power purchase agreement to develop a 
72 MW wind farm in south Sulawesi. The wind farm project will be the first large scale wind 
project in Indonesia and it marks “a significant milestone for Danish technology providers to 
penetrate the Indonesian market.”26  
In 2016, Denmark and Indonesia also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on supporting 
and developing cooperation in agriculture and food sectors. It consists of annual meetings in the 
Joint Agriculture Working Group with the aim to improve regulation and procedures on 
agricultural commodity trade and related investments, including food safety and promoting 
business partnerships.27 One of the key areas is the livestock sector, aiming for a public-private 
cooperation between the two countries on introducing new breed of adapted tropical diary and 
beef cattle in Indonesia.   
Other important cooperation agreements between Indonesia and Denmark are on green shipping 
and transportation. Indonesia and Denmark facilitate joint industrial business solutions in ship 
building design, for example through Danish industry support in the Indonesian National Ship 
Design Centre.28 Other cooperation relates to city transportation projects through the promotion 
of public transport and cycling.29 
Germany 
At the government negotiations in 2017, Germany committed funding of US$180 million to 
Indonesia. Of this amount, US$37 million has been earmarked for Technical Cooperation and 
US$143 million for Financial Cooperation.30 The German Agency for International Cooperation 
(GIZ) is working in Indonesia on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ). It also carries out projects for the German Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), the German Federal Foreign 
Office, and the European Union. The German-Indonesian cooperation focuses on three priority 
                                                   
25 Information retrieved from: https://ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/files/Globalcooperation/indonesia_cooperation_0.pdf  
26 Information retrieved from the annual report of the Danish Energy Agency for the Strategic Energy Sector Cooperation 
between Indonesia and Denmark, 2016: http://um.dk/~/media/UM/Danish-
site/Documents/Danida/Samarbejde/Ministerier/SSC/AArsrapporter%202016/Indonesien%20energi.pdf?la=da  
27 Information retrieved from the Plan of Action 2017-2020 for the Partnership between the Government of the Kingdom of 
Denmark and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia: http://um.dk/~/media/UM/Danish-
site/Documents/Udenrigspolitik/Lande%20og%20regioner/Strategiske%20partnerskaber/ID-DK%20Action%20Plan%202017-
2020.pdf?la=da 
28 Idem: http://um.dk/~/media/UM/Danish-
site/Documents/Udenrigspolitik/Lande%20og%20regioner/Strategiske%20partnerskaber/ID-DK%20Action%20Plan%202017-
2020.pdf?la=da 
29 Idem: http://um.dk/~/media/UM/Danish-
site/Documents/Udenrigspolitik/Lande%20og%20regioner/Strategiske%20partnerskaber/ID-DK%20Action%20Plan%202017-
2020.pdf?la=da 
30 Information retrieved from the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ): 
http://www.bmz.de/en/countries_regions/asien/indonesien/index.html#section-31151852  
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areas, on which good governance and cooperation with the private sector are cross-cutting 
issues:31  
1. Energy: Germany works in particular on renewable energy programmes and projects. For 
example: 
 Energising Development Partnership (2009-2018): GIZ claims that, to date, 189,000 
people, 1,500 public institutions and 2,700 rural businesses have gained access to 
electricity through this partnership.  
 Electrification through Renewable Energy Programme (2016-2019): It focuses on 
capacity building and knowledge exchange on off-grid electrification using renewable 
energy for Indonesian institutions.  
 1,000 Islands – Renewable Energy for Electrification Programme (2017-2020): It 
aims to achieve a 23% share of renewable energies in Indonesia, with a focus on 
electrification projects on smaller islands.  
2. Environmental protection and climate change: Indonesia plays a key role in the context of 
BMU’s international cooperation for climate change mitigation and biodiversity conversation. 
Hence, GIZ supports the Indonesian Government in conserving the natural forests. It cooperates 
with Indonesian institutions on the development and implementation of a legal framework, 
methods and services for sustainable forest management in, for example, the Forest and Climate 
Change Programme (2009-2020). Other projects are: 
 Green Chillers and Energy Efficiency (2014-2019): The project assists the 
Government of Indonesia, particularly Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, in 
establishing appropriate incentive mechanisms for the implementation of efficient 
Refrigeration and Air Conditioning (RAC) technology. To demonstrate the advantages of 
green cooling technology, pilot projects are implemented and RAC technicians are 
trained and nationally certified in the safe and efficient use of how hydrocarbons have an 
impact on the RAC sector. 
 Sustainable urban transport (2016-2020): In order to improve the transport situation in 
cities, push and pull measures are required that make energy-intensive private transport 
less attractive, and at the same time increase the appeal of public transport systems and 
non-motorised transport infrastructure.  
 Low-Emission Oil Palm Development (2017-2022): The project focuses its intervention 
into the lowering emission by saving forests (land use change) from conversion to 
plantation. It applies the landscape approach with the focus on district jurisdiction. The 
project aims to strengthen the capacity of Berau District Government in performing the 
critical functions in land use governance and plantation management: planning, 
monitoring, and licensing. 
3. Sustainable economic development and technical and vocational education and 
training: GIZ promotes exchange and cooperation between state actors and the private sector to 
align training courses with the needs of the labour market. Projects on sustainable economic 
                                                   
31 Information retrieved from the GIZ website: https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/352.html  
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development involves establishing and developing social security systems, for example a 
statutory health insurance system in Indonesia: 
 The Innovation and Investment Programme for Inclusive and Sustainable 
Economic Development (2017-2021): This programme aims to develop the capacity of 
private sector actors in selected economic sectors to create inclusive employment. It 
addresses the issue of employment using instruments such as an integrative approach to 
employment promotion, vocational training, and inclusive business. By doing so, it 
harnesses the potential of both private and state actors to create employment and train 
people in line with their capacities and potential.  
 Standards in the South-East Asian food trade (2015-2018): This project aims to 
increase export opportunities for the food sector in the ASEAN countries. It supports 
ASEAN in harmonising national standards and the ASEAN Standard for Organic 
Agriculture (ASOA). In the long term, quality standards in the ASEAN economic area are 
to be brought into line with internationally recognised standards such as Global GAP and 
the EU’s organic certification label. The project activities has been carried out primarily in 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, and the Philippines. 
 Inclusive Business Action Network (2014-2019): This programme is part of a broader 
strategy of BMZ to promote cooperation with the private sector through inclusive 
business models. It pursues an integrated strategic approach, going wide with online 
knowledge sharing and strategic communications on inclusive business, and going deep 
with its focused Capacity Development Programme for selected companies and 
policymakers in developing and emerging countries. 
Bilateral cooperation between the two countries focuses mainly on the same areas of renewable 
energy and vocational trainings, but also emphasises maritime cooperation. The countries signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding for Maritime Cooperation in 2017 with the intention to establish 
a strategical cooperation in the maritime sector.32  
Japan 
Over the long term, Japan has been the largest development cooperation partner of Indonesia. 
Japan contributed 45% of the total gross disbursement of ODA to Indonesia from 1960 to 2016, 
which amounted to US$87.34 billion (JICA, 2018, p.21). However, gross disbursement of ODA to 
Indonesia has declined in recent years (the largest ODA provider is now Germany) and because 
Indonesia has paid back many of the loans to Japan in recent years, the net disbursement of 
ODA to Indonesia is negative since 2004 and increasing, to up to US$1.2 billion in 2016 (JICA, 
2018, p.23). Technical assistance accounted for US$54 million in 2016. Finance and investment 
cooperation in the form of ODA loans and private sector investment finance, is approximately 
90% of the total ODA of around US$672 million in 2016 (JICA, 2018, p.23-25). Aid in the form of 
grants had been used by Japan up to 2013, mainly in the “agriculture, forestry and fishery” and 
“health and medical care” sectors. Since 2014 no grants have been provided to Indonesia (JICA, 
2018). 
                                                   
32 Information retrieved from the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: 
https://www.kemlu.go.id/en/berita/Pages/Indonesia---Germany-Raised-Various-Cooperation-in-Comprehensive-Partnership-
Scheme.aspx  
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Japanese loans were used to fill budget deficits as well as enhanced policy and regulation 
reforms through policy dialogue in the fields of macroeconomic stabilisation, investment climate 
and trade facilitation, public financial management, poverty reduction, climate change measures, 
and infrastructure development reform (JICA, 2018). For example, 266.3 billion yen (US$2.39 
million) for programme loans disbursed for 2005-2013 filled approximately 4.5% of total budget 
deficits during the same period (JICA, 2018, p.32). Furthermore, through policy dialogue on 
investment climate and trade facilitation, Japan supported amendment of the Investment 
Negative List (Daftar Negatif Investasi), introduction of the Investment One Stop Service, and 
issuing of transfer pricing regulation.  
According to the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Japanese technical 
cooperation has facilitated economic institutional reforms and capacity development in areas 
such as the national development plan (RPJPN), economic policy support, tax administration, 
and public-private partnerships for infrastructure development. Japan has enhanced 
infrastructure development through supporting the establishment of regulatory frameworks, such 
as PPP regulations (the Presidential Regulation No.38/2015, the BAPPENAS Regulation No. 
4/2015 and the LKPP Regulation No.19/2015) and Availability Payment regulations (the Ministry 
of Finance Regulation No.190/2015 and No. 260/2016 and the Ministry of Home Affairs 
Regulation No.96/2016) (JICA, 2018, p.32). 
Japan uses its development aid to Indonesia in a wide variety of sectors and sub-sectors (JICA, 
2018):33 
 Transport: Newly formed projects have focused mainly on technical cooperation 
(including preparation for new ODA loan projects) in the subsectors such as road, air, 
port, and sea transport, because the Indonesian Government indicated its intention to 
reduce external debt. Still, ODA loans have been continuously provided by Japan for 
large infrastructure projects such as urban railways and international harbour 
development. Indonesian Government institutions and enterprises have become 
technically more capable of implementing large-scale transportation projects, however, 
there is still need for assistance including transfer of Japanese technology for 
infrastructure development. 
 Energy: Since the late 2000s, Japan has provided comprehensive assistance, including 
human resource development, to promote geothermal and hydro-power development to 
Indonesia, as well as clean coal technologies, to achieve Indonesia’s policy goals 
towards sustainable growth and a decarbonised economy. 
 Waste and environmental management: In the 2010s, JICA has supported 3R initiative 
(reduce, reuse and recycle) activities, capacity development in waste management, as 
well as establishment of the Act on Solid Waste Management (No.18/2008) and other 
related rules and regulations at the national and regional levels. In general, Japanese 
cooperation contributed to institutional capacity building through the training of technical 
staff also on the district and local levels. Furthermore, a network for environmental 
monitoring of river and air pollution around the Environmental Management Centre was 
established. JICA states that this has contributed to the collection of “quality” air and 
water data.  
                                                   
33 Information on development cooperation on sector level, comes from JICA (2018) report on Indonesia. 
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 Private sector development: In the 2000s, in the reform period of democratisation and 
decentralisation, the mainstream of Japanese assistance in private sector development 
shifted to technical cooperation programmes to support industry promotion and SME 
promotion, to meet the national policy of strengthening the private sector nationwide. 
Since 2015, technical cooperation has focussed more on institutional improvement in 
areas such as intellectual property rights protection and consumer protection. In addition, 
JICA supports the strengthening of car, electric and electronics, and food processing 
value chains, with the aim to improve the international competitiveness of the 
manufacturing industry in Indonesia. Key functions for vocational training and industrial 
human resource development were established through a series of financial assistance 
and technical cooperation. Institutional arrangements were made for foreign investment 
and business activity through a number of experts and public-private policy dialogue. An 
activity model was formulated for product development and marketing promotion under 
the initiative of the local industry (SMEs), in collaboration with the relevant stakeholders 
such as central/local governments and supporting institutions (the Chamber of 
Commerce, higher education institutions, NGOs, etc.). This model has been 
disseminated to the rest of the country through the Ministry of Industry. 
 Agriculture, forestry and fishery: Irrigation projects in agriculture, and support for 
livestock and fishery have been priorities for the Japanese development aid. Cooperation 
in the fisheries subsector has aimed at improving protein intake from the aquaculture 
cooperation. There is also a long support for some important fishing ports, such as in 
Jakarta. Japan will support the Indonesian Government with implementation of the 
“National Sea Policy,” and would like to position it further in the economic development of 
sustainable marine fishery resources. In the livestock subsector, technical cooperation 
concentrated on 41 targeted “hub institutions”. In particular, the artificial insemination 
technology was used in South-South and Triangular Cooperation after the completion of 
technical cooperation. The production of frozen semen increased drastically from 200 
thousand doses (1985) to 3.5 million doses (2015), which according to JICA (2018) 
contributed to an increase in the national cattle population from 8 million to 13 million. 
 Climate change: JICA assisted in mechanisms such as Joint Crediting Mechanism 
(JCM), Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing 
Countries (REDD+). Assistance for climate change measures such as the Climate 
Change Programme Loans contributed to mainstreaming climate change within the 
Indonesian government and improving the capacity to cope with climate change issues. 
A strategy was launched for the government to manage forest protection and 
conservation areas together with local residents. For example, Manggala Agni 
(firefighting brigade) rooted in the local community and modelled on the Japanese 
volunteer fire corps was established. JICA also contributed to the establishment of the 
Mangrove Information Centre (MIC) and activities such as mangrove-related training, 
environmental education and ecotourism. Furthermore, Japan increasingly use 
knowledge and skills shared among ASEAN countries this field.  
Other important areas for Japan’s development cooperation are: decentralisation, education, 
health, and reducing disaster risks. 
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Norway 
The Norwegian government, via its agency for development cooperation Norad, funded US$32.5 
million (279.3 million Norwegian Krone) in development programmes in Indonesia in 2017.34 
Almost 90% of the aid money (252 million Krone or US$29 million) went to development 
programmes related to environment (forest protection). Only 0.4% of the aid (less than 1 million 
Krone or US$115,000) went to programmes for economic development and trade, which focused 
mainly on agriculture and fishery in 2017.35 Economic development and trade is the least funded, 
less than for education, health and good governance, which combined received 27 million 
Norwegian Krone (US$3.1 million) in 2017. 
Norway has supported Indonesia mainly through its Climate and Forest Initiative to reduce 
greenhouse emissions by 26% between 2009 and 2020 through domestic efforts and by 41% 
with international support. On top of its aid commitments, Norway has committed to disburse up 
to US$1 billion in the period between 2011 and 2020, on the condition that Indonesia reduce its 
emissions of greenhouse gases through its efforts in the Reduce Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+).36 Before the funds are released to the 
partnership, requirements placed on Indonesia include to establishment of a verifiable and 
internationally accepted method for measuring deforestation. As part of this agreement, 
Indonesia established a suspension on new permits to clear primary forests (Presidential 
Instruction no.10/2011). 
According to Norad, progress has been made, but work still remains to be done. It states on its 
website: “Under the partnership with Norway, Indonesia has strengthened its enforcement of 
laws pertaining to illegal logging. Local communities, indigenous peoples and the environmental 
movement have increasingly been included and consulted in the design of relevant policies. The 
rights of indigenous people are enjoying greater recognition.”37 According to an independent 
evaluation, the Norwegian contributions through the Climate and Forest Initiative have helped put 
preservation of the rainforest onto the political agenda in Indonesia.38 In 2018, the suspension on 
the granting of new licences, mainly for palm oil plantations to clear primary forests was for a 
second time renewed for three years.  
Examples of projects that have been granted support through the Norwegian Climate and Forest 
Initiative in Indonesia include: 
 An agreement with the Global Green Growth Institute to contribute to Indonesia’s 
economic development plans and to provide technical assistance to the Indonesian 
REDD+ process. 
 A programme under the auspices of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes 
(UNODC) to fight forest crimes. The programme has reinforced The Special Responsive 
                                                   
34 Information retrieved from Norad website: https://norad.no/en/front/countries/asia-and-oceania/indonesia/  
35 Idem: https://norad.no/en/front/countries/asia-and-oceania/indonesia/  
36 Information retrieved from REDD task force website: http://theredddesk.org/countries/indonesia/   
37 Information retrieved from Norad website: https://norad.no/en/front/countries/asia-and-oceania/indonesia/  
38 See here for the evaluation of Rainforest Foundation (2017) on Norad’s work on Climate and Environment in Indonesia: 
https://norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2017/evaluation-of-rainforest-foundation-norways-work-in-indonesia/  
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Police Forest Task Force, improved capacity in the legal system and provided support to 
civil society. 
 The World Bank’s work on provision of quality assurance for the funding mechanism 
REDD+. 
 Training for journalists with regard to climate and REDD+ issues. This support was 
granted to the Dr. Soetomo Press Institute, Jakarta.  
Norway has been a key player in the global sustainable palm oil value chain movement. At least 
285 companies worldwide have made commitments in the palm oil sector, with 267 of them 
aiming to achieve their goals in whole or in part by purchasing palm oil that has been certified as 
sustainable. Exporting companies with commitments have shifted from zero-deforestation 
commitments to more specific and detailed no-deforestation, no-peat, no-exploitation (NDPE) 
commitments developed in cooperation with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). They also 
include commitments to restore previously disrupted forests and peatlands, and to embrace fair 
labour practices. Furthermore, Norway became the first country in 2018 to introduce a ban on the 
import of palm oil for use in biofuels by 2020 in the fight against deforestation, in particular in 
Indonesia and Malaysia (producing together 80% of the palm oil in the world).39   
Norway-Indonesia business relations focus mainly on energy and fishery sectors. There are 
approximately 150 Norwegian companies present in Indonesia in some way.40 Green 
technologies or sustainable solutions are key in the business relationship as there is a growing 
demand for such technologies in Indonesia. Norway and Indonesia have had several bilateral 
Energy Dialogues, and Norwegian businesses see an opportunity to offer solutions that can 
contribute to the Indonesian ambition of an additional electricity production capacity of 35,000 
MgW by 2019. This is particularly relevant for the renewable energy sector. Over the past years, 
Norway granted development funding for the construction of solar-powered irrigation and biogas 
installations in Indonesia, mainly through projects of the Asian Development Bank and the Dutch 
development NGO Hivos. However, since 2017 no further funding went to energy related 
projects. Nevertheless, Norwegian businesses are also involved in further development of the 
Indonesian oil and gas sector. Additionally, Norway and Indonesia cooperate on fisheries and 
sustainable management of marine resources. Norwegian businesses are working with 
Indonesian aquaculture and fisheries industries, and Norwegian experts have contributed with 
knowledge and experience when it comes to combatting fisheries crime.  
United States of America 
The US government’s foreign aid to Indonesia was US$277 million in 2017. The largest part 
(US$148 million) was implemented through the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID), followed by US$72 million through the Department of Health and Human Services, 
US$31 million through the Department of State, and US$17 million through the Department of 
Army.41 The largest part of the foreign aid budget to Indonesia went to basic health, like 
infectious disease control (US$81 million). Other main target areas, were: legal and judicial 
                                                   
39 Information retrieved from: https://www.ecowatch.com/norway-bans-palm-oil-2622712445.html  
40 Information retrieved from the Norway Embassy in Jakarta website: https://www.norway.no/en/indonesia/values-
priorities/energy-marine-res/#local-content  
41 Information retrieved from USAID website: https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/IDN?fiscal_year=2017&measure=Obligations  
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development (US$33 million); reproductive health care (US$19 million); biodiversity (US$18 
million); security system management and reform (US$17 million); higher education (US$17 
million); biosphere protection (US$16 million); public sector policy and administrative 
management (US$13 million); HIV/Aids control (US$9.5 million); disaster prevention and 
preparedness (US$9 million), and basic drinking water supply and basic sanitation (US$7.8 
million).42 Hence, it can be concluded that the main area for US foreign aid is health, followed at 
a distance by governance, and then environmental protection.  
Most of the funding for basic health to Indonesia was implemented by the Department of Health 
and Human Services, while USAID focused on the reproductive health care, HIV/Aids control, 
and basic drinking water and sanitation programmes. USAID furthermore focussed on the 
environmental protection, higher education, governance and disaster prevention programmes. 
Compared with the whole aid structure, there is less focus on infrastructure (US$3.5 million), 
agriculture (US$2.9 million), and economic growth (US$3.7 million).43 All the aid labelled for 
infrastructure went to the energy sector for hydro-electric power plants and capacity building for 
energy policy and management. Most of the economic growth programmes relate to 
improvement of trade (US$2.4 million), through trade facilitation and trade policy and 
management support. Far less went to financial sector development, industrial development, and 
support for SMEs.44 
The US-Indonesia development cooperation has evolved from traditional development 
assistance to the provision of technical assistance and tools to address development challenges, 
particularly through private sector engagement and the utilisation of science and technology: 
“USAID mechanisms are designed to strengthen Indonesian systems and institutions, mobilise 
domestic resources, leverage the private sector and ‘crowd‘ in new sources of financing”.45 As a 
middle-income country USAID’s assistance to Indonesia is designed on its “Journey to Self-
Reliance”. USAID defines “self-reliance” as a country’s ability to plan, finance and implement 
solutions to address its own development challenges.46  
USAID’s country development cooperation strategy for Indonesia runs from 2014 to 2020 and 
has three development objectives: 
 Democratic governance and security strengthened, which focuses on improving 
government accountability, combating corruption, protection of human rights, and 
strengthening key institutions’ ability to counter extremism. 
 Essential human services to targeted populations improved and sustained, which aims 
to reduce preventable deaths of women and children, expanding access to water and 
sanitation, and improving the capacity of educational institutions. 
                                                   
42 Idem: https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/IDN?fiscal_year=2017&measure=Obligations  
43 Idem: https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/IDN?fiscal_year=2017&measure=Obligations  
44 Idem: https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/IDN?fiscal_year=2017&measure=Obligations  
45 Information retrieved from the USAID website: https://www.usaid.gov/indonesia/cdcs  
46 See for more information on self-relience: https://selfreliance.usaid.gov/country/indonesia  
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 Global development priorities of mutual prosperity advanced, which highlights 
reducing infectious disease threats, enhancing environmental security and resilience, and 
decreasing constraints to economic opportunity. 
Next to renewable energy and forest protection programmes, one of the key areas in the 
environmental strategy is the protection of the marine ecosystem by strengthening the 
management of over one million hectares of Marine Protected Areas (MPA) in Maluku and West 
Papua. This has resulted in that West Papua’s Dampier Strait as a legally-protected Territorial 
Use Rights in Fisheries (TURF) to help ensure a sustainable food supply for local communities. 
At 211,000 hectares, the Dampier Strait network is the largest TURF-Reserve network in the 
world.47 The USAID Oceans and Fisheries Partnership (USAID Oceans) works with businesses 
on sustainable, traceable fisheries to encourage private sector commitments. The annual Our 
Ocean Conference was held in Bali in 2018. During the conference, the USAID and Walton 
Family Foundation launched a US$15 million Blue Abadi Fund for long-term marine 
conservation, expanding the impact for two of USAID’s current marine resource conservation 
activities: Indonesia Sustainable Ecosystem Advanced (SEA) and Supporting Nature and People 
– Partnership for Enduring Resources (SNAPPER).48 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
The UNDP in Indonesia works on democratic governance, environment and energy, poverty 
reduction, and disaster prevention and recovery. Their poverty reduction work focusses mainly 
on gender equality and health. Current programmes are, for example, the Sistem 
Monitoring Imunisasi Logistik secarea Elektronik (SMILE), which is an innovative 
technological solution that aims to strengthen the immunisation supply chain system in 
Indonesia. Other projects include reducing polybromodiphenyl ethers and other 
unintentional persistent organic pollutants, and the reform of the justice system in 
Indonesia.  
UNDP has the most projects in environment and energy programmes, for example, in 
strategic planning and action to strengthen climate resilience of rural communities in the 
province East Nusa Tenggara. The Biodiversity Finance Initiative (BIOFIN) provides an 
innovative methodology enabling countries to measure their current biodiversity 
expenditures, assess their financial needs in the medium term and identify the most 
suitable finance solutions to bridge their national biodiversity finance gaps. UNDP also 
works on wind hybrid power generation; strengthening community-based forestry and 
watershed management; fighting deforestation with REDD+, and the BIOCHAR project on 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  
World Bank Group 
Currently the World Bank has invested in 25 projects in Indonesia (6 on Environment and Natural 
Resources; 5 on Energy and Extractives; 5 on Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience; 4 on Water; 2 
on Finance and Competitiveness; 1 on Transport; 1 on Education; 1 on Agriculture). These total 
                                                   
47 Information retrieved from the USAID website: https://www.usaid.gov/indonesia/environment  
48 Information retrieved from US embassy in Jakarta website: https://id.usembassy.gov/usaid-walton-family-foundation-launch-
new-partnership-protect-indonesias-fisheries-marine-biodiversity/  
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US$4.2 billion and operate in 790 locations. IFC, which is member of the World Bank Group, 
invested in 32 projects in Indonesia. In the Country Partnership Framework 2016-2020 for 
Indonesia, the World Bank Group has identified six engagement areas (World Bank, 2015):49  
 Infrastructure platforms at the national level: Investments have mainly focussed on 
three development outcomes, related to: increased access to water irrigation and dam 
safety (i.e. the number of people benefiting from improved irrigation and dam safety); 
increased access to affordable housing, for example the number of low-income 
households with access to affordable ‘core starter’ public housing units and through 
credit-linked down payment subsidies; and, improved integrated tourism development 
with infrastructure projects (such as increasing the number of integrated tourism 
destinations established, or the number of integrated tourism master plans prepared). 
 Sustainable energy and universal access: The government of Indonesia has set some 
important goals to reduce the US$50 billion investment deficit, with 60 million people with 
no dependable access, and limited success using renewables for generation. The World 
Bank Group therefore engages with the Government to use a full set of interventions 
including private sector investment, lending, DPLs, and knowledge services to: improve 
operational efficiency and reliability of services through transmission and distribution, 
improvement in pumped storage support renewable energy, and low carbon development 
increase access to modern energy services. The reform efforts simultaneously improve 
IFC’s ability to come in with financing and syndications from commercial banks to support 
additional renewable generation (particularly geothermal and hydro-power). 
 Maritime economy and connectivity: To support the Government of Indonesia in its 
goal of Indonesia as a Maritime Nation, the World Bank Group interventions include a 
blend of investment lending, DPLs, possible IFC investment, Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) guarantee and knowledge services to support: 
creation of an improved regulatory and operating environment which supports investment 
by both public and private sectors,  port development and operation, hinterland 
connectivity in port areas including land and air-based transport, and development of the 
blue economy. The World Bank Group will also look to help integrate sustainable marine 
and fisheries natural resources into the overall maritime approach. It is expected that 
particular emphasis will be in eastern Indonesia. 
 Delivery of local services and infrastructure: To fight inequality, the World Bank 
Group focusses on access to health and education services and basic infrastructure such 
as sanitation. This engagement will be organised around three pillars using investment 
and knowledge services: strengthening the decentralisation framework to improve local 
service delivery; supporting the delivery of quality education and health services, water 
and sanitation in rural areas to directly address inequality of opportunity, and ,supporting 
the sustainable urbanisation of cities, particularly through infrastructure development.  
 Sustainable landscape management (environmental policy): Because one fifth of 
Indonesia’s poor live in coastal and forest regions, the World Bank Group focusses on 
limiting over-exploitation and degradation of natural resources to reduce poverty in 
Indonesia, as well as global impact in terms of climate change. This engagement seeks 
                                                   
49 The information on the engagement areas is all retrieved from the World Bank (2015) publication on the Country Partnership 
Framework: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/195141467986374707/pdf/99172-REVISED-World-Bank-Indonesia-
Country-Partnership-Framework-2016-2020.pdf  
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to change World Bank Group’s approach from incremental to one that focuses on 
managing landscapes through improved spatial planning, and land allocation to help shift 
the development trajectory. The World Bank is doing this through: support for design and 
implementation of programmes to improve management and benefits of terrestrial natural 
assets, support land management and spatial planning to address problem of dual land 
management system, create demonstration models of sustainable development of 
natural resources with the private sector, and disaster management, mitigation and 
preparedness. 
 Collecting more and spending better (fiscal policy): To improve Indonesia’s revenue-
to-GDP and tax-to-GDP ratios, the World Bank Group supports the Government of 
Indonesia to raise revenues, transform tax collection administration, and improve the 
composition and effectiveness of public spending. This engagement uses investment and 
policy-based lending and knowledge services to support government in the following 
areas:  
o Revenue: supporting the revision of select tax policies, supporting reforms to 
increase tax compliance and strengthening and mainstreaming non-tax revenue 
administration.  
o Improve spending through: advancing energy (fuel and electricity) subsidy 
reforms, better quality through improved allocative efficiency, and better budget 
execution in key areas such as infrastructure, strengthen institutional capacity to 
modernise procurement and contract management and control environment.  
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